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The Modal Moving Spotlight Theory 
DANIEL DEASY 
School of Philosophy, University College Dublin, Ireland 
Forthcoming in Mind 
 
1. The moving spotlight 
Say that the Moving Spotlight Theory (MST) combines the following three theses: 
 
A-THEORY: There is an absolute distinction between present and non-present times1 
 
PERMANENTISM:  Always, everything is always something  
A∀xA∃y y=x 
 
SPOTLIGHT: Exactly one fundamental property is temporary, and it is monadic 
 
A few remarks on these. First, not all self-described MSTists accept all of the above. 
For instance, Cameron (2015) defends a view that he describes as a version of MST which 
implies the falsehood of both Permanentism and Spotlight (on Cameron’s view, there are 
temporary ‘states of affairs’, and there are many temporary fundamental properties – namely 
the fundamental ages of things). I do not mean to legislate here for the use of the name 
‘MST’ – it is merely a label of convenience for the conjunction of the above theses.  
Second, the A-theory is supposed to be read as a non-trivial thesis that would be 
rejected by those who hold that the predicate ‘is present’ is an indexical expression, 
                                               
1 I address the question of how MSTists should conceive of times in §4 below.    
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analogous to ‘is here’2. However, note that it is supposed to be consistent with the A-theory 
that presentness understood as a property whose instances include times is a non-fundamental 
property.  
Permanentism is reminiscent of the familiar thesis of ‘Eternalism’, but unlike that 
view – at least, as commonly understood – it does not entail a commitment to the 
concreteness of merely past and future things. For example, although Permanentism entails 
that if sometimes, something is a concrete dodo (S∃x(Cx ⋀ Dx)) then something is sometimes 
a concrete dodo (∃xS(Cx ⋀ Dx)), it does not entail that there are concrete dodos (∃x(Cx ⋀ 
Dx)); it is consistent with Permanentism that formerly concrete dodos are no longer concrete, 
or no longer dodos.  
Spotlight is the view that there is exactly one temporary fundamental property, and 
that property is monadic. By ‘property’ in Spotlight (and throughout) I mean ‘monadic or 
polyadic property’, i.e. ‘property or relation’ (unless otherwise specified). A property is 
fundamental just in case it ‘carves reality at the joints’ or is ‘perfectly natural’ in the sense of 
Lewis (1983). I assume that part of the role of the fundamental properties is to provide a 
‘basis’ for all properties, in the sense that every property can (in principle) be analysed in 
terms of some fundamental properties. And a property is temporary just in case sometimes, 
something sometimes has it and sometimes lacks it (S∃x(SFx ⋀ S¬Fx)). 
Spotlight does not specify that the unique temporary fundamental property is 
presentness. That might seem odd, but there is a good reason for it: MST is compatible with 
several different views about the relation between the property or properties expressed by the 
word ‘present’ in English and the unique temporary fundamental property. For example, 
according to traditional versions of MST, the unique temporary fundamental property is a 
property of times, so that ‘is present’ as a predicate of times expresses the unique temporary 
                                               
2 Such as Sider (2001).  
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fundamental property. However, MSTists could reject this traditional version of the view in 
favour of the view that e.g. the only bearers of the temporary fundamental property are 
spacetime points, and that times – conceived as sets or fusions of points – do not possess the 
unique temporary fundamental property.3 In that case, it is false that ‘is present’ as a 
predicate of times expresses the unique temporary fundamental property. Similarly, MSTists 
might think that ‘is present’ in English expresses a property that human beings possess when 
they are alive, but that no human being ever possesses the unique temporary fundamental 
property. In order to accommodate versions of MST on which ‘present’ in English typically 
expresses a non-fundamental temporary property (e.g. of times or of living people), it is 
better to characterise MST in terms of the weaker version of Spotlight above. Nevertheless, it 
is useful to have a name for the unique temporary fundamental property, whatever it may be. 
So, from now I will refer to it as ‘fundamental presentness’, being careful to distinguish it 
from any non-fundamental properties of presentness. 
The view that fundamental presentness is the only temporary fundamental property is 
of course compatible with there being many temporary non-fundamental properties; and 
indeed, since MSTists should accept Temporalism (the view that there are temporary 
propositions – see §2 below), and if Temporalism is true then many ordinary predicates 
express temporary properties, MSTists should accept that many ordinary predicates express 
temporary non-fundamental properties whose analysis involves fundamental presentness. 
One way (but not the only way) to do to this is to accept the following semantic thesis: 
 
ABOUT PRESENTNESS: For each property F expressed by an ordinary predicate, there 
is a permanent relation R such that F is the temporary property of bearing R to a 
                                               




About Presentness implies that ordinary predicates such as ‘is sitting’ express 
temporary properties of bearing certain permanent relations to a present time, so that e.g. the 
predicate ‘is sitting’ expresses the temporary (monadic) property of sitting-at a present time. 
Given About Presentness, the sentence (where ‘Dx’ means ‘x is a dodo’) 
 
 (1) It was the case that there is a dodo 
 P∃xDx 
 
is equivalent to (where ‘D(x,y)’ means ‘x is a dodo-at y’): 
 
 (2) It was the case that there is a dodo-at a present time  
P(∃x∃t(Present(t) ⋀ D(x, t))) 
 
In what follows, I do not assume the truth of About Presentness given MST, but everything 
that follows is consistent with an acceptance of that view by MSTists.  
 Question: must those who accept MST as defined above also hold that some tense 
operators are fundamental, or can they provide a reductive analysis of the tense operators? 
(By ‘tense operators’ I mean sentence operators like ‘It was the case that’ (‘P’), ‘It will be the 
case that’ (‘F’), and ‘It is the case at time t that’ (‘at t’). To say that a tense operator is 
fundamental is just to say that the property of propositions it expresses – such as being past 
or being future – is fundamental.5) In this paper, I argue that MSTists can provide a reductive 
                                               
4 This view is recommended to MSTists by Deasy (2015).  
5 I assume that sentence operators, and therefore tense operators in particular, express (higher-order) properties 
of propositions. On the higher-order approach to sentence operators, see e.g. Dorr (2016) and Fritz & Goodman 
(2016, §3). 
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analysis of the tense operators – in essence, a reductive account of change over time. I do this 
by developing a new analysis of the tense operators given MST which I call the Modal 
Analysis (so-called because it analyses tense operators in terms of a necessitation relation 
between propositions). The Modal Analysis can be thought of as a spelling-out in more 
fundamental terms of an analysis of the tense operators due to Parsons (2002), which I call 
the Counterfactual Analysis. I do not argue that the Modal Analysis represents the only, or 
even the best, way to combine the reduction of tense with MST. My aim is simply to present 
the Modal Analysis as one attractive way to deliver the reduction of tense given MST.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: first (§2), I describe Parsons’ (2002) 
Counterfactual Analysis. I argue that the Counterfactual Analysis meets an important 
condition for securing change over time which is accepted by many A-theorists. Then (§3) I 
introduce the Modal Analysis as a spelling-out, in more fundamental terms, of the 
Counterfactual Analysis. Next (§4), I combine this with a new account of times and 
fundamental presentness given MST. Finally (§5), I argue that the Modal Analysis shares the 
virtues of, and avoids the problems facing, the Counterfactual Analysis.  
 
2. The counterfactual analysis 
Parsons (2002, p. 1-2) describes ‘the comprehensive A-theory which should be most 
plausible by the lights of the B-theorist: the “A-theory for B-theorists”’. Parsons’ ‘A-theory 
for B-theorists’ combines Permanentism and the A-theory with what I shall call the 
Counterfactual Analysis of the tense operators. It is useful to think of the Counterfactual 
Analysis as combining two separate analyses, as follows: first, what I shall call the 
Quantificational Analyses of the tense operators ‘It was the case that’ (‘P’) and ‘It will be the 
case that’ (‘F’) (where ‘x<y’ means ‘x is earlier than y’): 
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For it to have been the case that p is just for it to be the case that there is a time earlier 
than a present time at which p 
Pp ≡ ∃t1∃t2(Present(t1) ⋀ t2<t1 ⋀ at t2(p))6 
 
For it to be such that it will be the case that p is just for it to be the case that there is a 
time later than a present time at which p 
Fp ≡ ∃t1∃t2(Present(t1) ⋀ t1<t2 ⋀ at t2(p)) 
 
For example, given the Quantificational Analysis of ‘P’, sentence (1) above is equivalent to: 
 
(3) There is a time earlier than a present time at which there is a dodo 
∃t1∃t2(Present(t1) ⋀ t2<t1 ⋀ at t2(∃xDx)) 
 
Second, Parsons’ ‘counterfactual’ analysis of the tense operator ‘It is the case at time t 
that’ (‘at t’): 
 
AT-T (COUNTERFACTUAL): For it to be the case that at t, p is for it to be the case that if 
t were present, it would be that p 
At t(p) ≡ Present(t) □→ p 
 
For example, if we apply Parsons’ analysis of ‘at t’ to sentence (3) above, we get: 
 
(4) There is a time earlier than a present time, and were that time present, there would 
be a dodo 
                                               
6 I follow Dorr (2016) in using ‘≡’ to indicate the giving of an analysis or ‘real definition’.  
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∃t1∃t2(Present(t1) ⋀ t2<t1 ⋀ (Present(t2) □→ ∃xDx)) 
 
In short, according to the Counterfactual Analysis, what was is what would be were some 
past time present, and what will be is what would be were some future time present. 
 Parsons’ Counterfactual Analysis seems to provide an attractive way to deliver the 
reduction of tense given MST. However, some might question whether the view that results 
from combining the Counterfactual Analysis with MST secures change over time. This is a 
difficult question, since different philosophers of time have different ideas – not always 
explicitly stated! – about what is required for there to be change over time. However, we can 
at least show that the combination of MST and the Counterfactual Analysis meets one 
widely-accepted (by A-theorists, at least) necessary condition for there being change over 
time.  
Consider the thesis of Temporalism: 
 
TEMPORALISM: For some p, sometimes p and sometimes not-p 
∃p(Sp ⋀ S¬p) 
 
We can think of Temporalism as the view that there are temporary propositions: propositions 
that are sometimes true and sometimes false, such as the proposition that I am sitting.7 An 
example of a non-temporary or permanent proposition is the proposition that I am sitting at n, 
where ‘n’ names this time: given that it is true, it is always true, and if it were false, it would 
always be false.8  
                                               
7 Not everyone will agree that this is an example of a temporary proposition, but that is because not everyone 
accepts that there are temporary propositions. See Brogaard (2012) and Bacon (2016) for recent defences of 
Temporalism.  
8 Following Prior (1971), Temporalism can be read as involving irreducibly higher-order quantification. In that 
case, Temporalism is compatible with the view that there are no such things (quantifying at the first-order) as 
propositions.  
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Many A-theorists hold that there is change over time only if Temporalism is true.  
For example, here is Prior: 
 
To say that a change has occurred is to say at least this much: that something which 
was the case formerly is not the case now. That is, it is at least to say that for some 
sentence p we have ‘It was the case that p, and it is not the case that p’. (Prior 1968, p. 
9)9 
 
According to Prior, a change has occurred only if for some p, it was the case that p and it is 
not the case that p (∃p(Pp ⋀ ¬p)). Generalising, we can say that change sometimes occurs – 
i.e. that there is change over time – only if for some p, sometimes p and sometimes not-p, i.e. 
only if Temporalism is true. Call this thesis Priorian Change: 
 
PRIORIAN CHANGE: There is change over time only if Temporalism is true 
 
MSTists who accept Priorian Change will want to ensure that their view secures the 
truth of Temporalism given any proposed reductive analysis of the tense operators. Given the 
Counterfactual Analysis, Temporalism reduces to: 
 
(5) For some p, there is a time such that were it present, it would be that p, and there 
is a time such that were it present, it would be that not-p  
∃p(∃t1(Present(t1) □→ p) ⋀ ∃t2(Present(t2) □→ ¬p)) 
 
                                               
9 Prior’s use of the expression ‘for some sentence p’ here is apt to give the impression that his explanation of 
change involves first-order quantification over sentences, rather than higher-order quantification into sentence 
position. However, taking Prior’s broader views into account – in particular, his seminal defence of primitive 
higher-order quantification in Prior (1971) – it seems plausible that this was just an unfortunate slip.  
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And given MST, (5) is true. As a witness, consider the proposition that this time n is present 
(although note that any time would do). There is a time t1 – namely, n – such that were t1 
present, that proposition would be true. And there is a time t2 – e.g. some moment in 1996 – 
such that were t2 present, that proposition would be false (since it would still be true that only 
one time was present). It follows that given the combination of the Counterfactual Analysis 
with MST, Temporalism is true.  
Some might object that change over time requires, not just the truth of Temporalism, 
but the fundamental truth of Temporalism. Given that Temporalism involves the tense 
operator ‘It is sometimes the case that’ (‘S’), this objection implies that there is change over 
time only if some of the properties of propositions expressed by tense operators are 
fundamental. But why should we think that nothing changes if the properties of propositions 
expressed by tense operators are not fundamental? Unlike the view that nothing changes if 
the facts don’t change (i.e. if Temporalism is false), the justification for this view is not at all 
clear. 
We have seen that the Counterfactual Analysis provides MSTists with an analysis of 
the tense operators which secures the truth of Temporalism, and therefore meets the 
requirement for change expressed by Priorian Change. However, there are at least three good 
reasons for MSTists to look for an alternative analysis of the tense operators. 
First, it is not clear that the Counterfactual Analysis secures the basic principles of 
standard linear tense logic. For example, consider Sometimes Elimination, the temporal 
analogue of the widely-accepted modal axiom ‘4’ that what is possibly possible is possible 
(∀p(♢♢p → ♢p)): 
 
SOMETIMES ELIMINATION: What is sometimes sometimes the case is sometimes the 
case  
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∀p(SSp → Sp) 
 
Given the Counterfactual Analysis, Sometimes Elimination is equivalent to: 
 
(6) ∀p(∃t1(Present(t1) □→ ∃t2(Present(t2) □→ p)) → ∃t3(Present(t3) □→ p)) 
 
But the truth of (6) does not follow from any standard principles of counterfactual logic. It 
would be nice to find an analysis of the tense operators that secures standard tense-logical 
axioms such as Sometimes Elimination given MST.  
Second, given that counterfactuals are not fundamental, the Counterfactual Analysis 
does not provide an analysis of sentences of the form ‘at t(p)’ in fundamental terms given an 
analysis of p in fundamental terms. It would be nice to find an analysis of the tense operators 
that does.  
 Third, the Counterfactual Analysis faces a problem of circularity. In particular, it 
appears to be necessary to use temporal notions in order to provide a reading of the relevant 
counterfactuals on which the Counterfactual Analysis is extensionally adequate. To see this, 
consider that given the combination of the Counterfactual Analysis with MST, the truth of  
 
 (7) Jones was dancing  
 
requires the truth of 
 
(8) There is a past time t such that were t present, Jones would be dancing 
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On the standard account of the semantics of counterfactuals, sentences of the form ‘Were it 
the case that p, it would be the case that q’ are true just in case q is true in all of the p-worlds 
‘closest to’ – i.e. most relevantly similar to – the actual world.10 In that case, given the 
combination of Counterfactual Analysis with MST, the truth of (7) requires the truth of  
 
(9) There is a past time t such that in all of the worlds closest to the actual world in 
which t is present, Jones is dancing 
 
But note that even if it is actually the case that Jones is dancing at a past time, it could 
have failed to be the case that Jones is dancing at a past time. For example, holding fixed the 
actual permanent relations between times, Jones could have failed to be dancing at any past 
time; or, the actual permanent relations between times could have been different such that all 
of the times at which Jones is actually dancing are future times.11 In ‘possible worlds’ terms: 
even if in the actual world Jones is dancing at a past time t, there are (merely) possible worlds 
in which Jones is not dancing at t (or at any other past time). In that case, in order to secure 
the truth of (7) given MST, defenders of the Counterfactual Analysis must somehow exclude 
worlds in which Jones is not dancing at any of the times that are actually past from the set of 
relevantly-similar-to-actual worlds mentioned in the antecedent of (9). More generally, the 
Counterfactual Analysis only works given MST on condition that the actual permanent facts 
– e.g. truths about the actual permanent relations between individuals and times, such as that 
Jones bears the permanent dancing-at relation to a certain time t – are held fixed in the 
assessment of the relevant counterfactuals. However, in that case the Counterfactual Analysis 
is ultimately circular, as what it is for a fact to be permanent is for it to be always true, and 
                                               
10 See e.g. Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973).  
11 See Dorr & Goodman (2020) for some relevant work on the interaction between tense and modality.  
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being always true is one of the properties of propositions for which the Counterfactual 
Analysis is supposed to provide an analysis.12 Let us call this the ‘circularity problem’ for the 
Counterfactual Analysis.  
 
3. The modal analysis: introduction 
The best way to introduce the Modal Analysis is to consider the question of whether 
defenders of the Counterfactual Analysis can find some way of characterising the permanent 
facts given MST without mentioning their permanence. And it seems they can: as we saw in 
§1 above, according to MST, fundamental presentness is the unique temporary fundamental 
property. It follows that given MST, if a fact is not about fundamental presentness – in the 
sense of being a conjunction of attributions to things (of the appropriate type) of fundamental 
first- or higher-order properties other than fundamental presentness and their negations – then 
it is permanent. In that case, a defender of the Counterfactual Analysis could characterize the 
relevant reading of the counterfactuals given MST as that on which the facts not about 
fundamental presentness are held fixed – so that, for example, (7) (‘Jones was dancing’) is 
true just in case there is a past time t such that holding fixed the facts not about fundamental 
presentness, were t present, Jones would be dancing.  
However, this idea naturally suggests a more fundamental analysis of ‘at t’ given 
MST, as follows (where ‘Cp’ means ‘p is not about fundamental presentness’ in the sense 
described above, and ‘Present(x)’ means ‘x is the present time’): 
 
AT-T (NECESSITATION): For it to be the case that at t, p is for it to be the case that p is 
necessitated by some true proposition q not about fundamental presentness and the 
proposition that t is the present time  
                                               
12 On the standard account, Ap reduces to ¬S¬p, and Sp reduces to Pp ⋁ p ⋁ Fp. 
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At t(p) ≡ ∃q(q ⋀ Cq ⋀ □((q ⋀ Present(t)) → p))13 
 
Or, equivalently:  
 
AT-T (COMPATIBILITY): For it to be the case that at t, p is for it to be the case that p is 
compatible with any true proposition q not about fundamental presentness and the 
proposition that t is the present time 
At t(p) ≡ ∀q((q ⋀ Cq) → ♢(p ⋀ q ⋀ Present(t))) 
 
Call the combination of the Quantificational Analyses of ‘P’ and ‘F’ (§2) with either of the 
above analyses of ‘at t’ the Modal Analysis.14 Informally, the Modal Analysis says that 
something is true at a time t just in case it is necessitated by some permanent fact and the 
proposition that t is the present time; or equivalently, just in case it is compatible with the 
conjunction of any permanent fact and the proposition that t is the present time.  
To see that the Necessitation and Compatibility analyses of ‘at t’ above are 
equivalent, notice that if p is compatible with any true proposition q not about fundamental 
presentness and the proposition that t is the present time (i.e. if it is true that ∀q((q ⋀ C(q)) → 
♢(p ⋀ q ⋀ Present(t)))), then in particular, p is compatible with the fact q not about 
                                               
13 Whether the ‘◻’ here should be interpreted as expressing ‘metaphysical’ necessity, ‘broad’ necessity (see 
Bacon 2018) or some other kind of necessity is a question on which I remain neutral (along with the question of 
whether metaphysical necessity is broad necessity). However, see note 24 below for a reason to think that it 
expresses something narrower than either metaphysical or broad necessity. 
14 It is important that the ‘facts not about fundamental presentness’ in these analyses are characterised as above 
in terms of attributions of fundamental first- or higher-order properties other than fundamental presentness. For 
example, suppose that the believing relation between individuals and propositions is a fundamental higher-order 
relation not supervenient on any other fundamental relations (as it might be according to some forms of property 
dualism), and that ‘Jones believes that fundamental presentness is interesting’ is true. Then given the tense-
logical axiom Sometimes Introduction (∀p(p → Sp)), ‘Sometimes, Jones believes that fundamental presentness 
is interesting’ is true. Given the Modal Analysis, this is equivalent to: ‘For some time t, the proposition that 
Jones believes that fundamental presentness is interesting is necessitated by some true proposition q not about 
fundamental presentness and the proposition that t is the present time’. But this sentence is true – and therefore a 
failure of Sometimes Introduction is avoided – only if the facts ‘not about fundamental presentness’ include 
attributions of fundamental higher-order relations such as the believing relation.  
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fundamental presentness that fully specifies what there is and what fundamental first- or 
higher-order properties other than fundamental presentness are instantiated by things of the 
appropriate type; and any such truth, when combined with a proposition that fully specifies 
which things have the remaining fundamental property (of fundamental presentness), is 
maximally strong, and hence necessitates everything with which it is compatible (and 
therefore necessitates p).  
Readers will notice that the above argument relies on the significant premise that 
everything supervenes on the distribution of fundamental properties, or in other words, that 
‘truth supervenes on being’ (TSB). That should come as no surprise: given that the Modal 
Analysis requires there to be a well-defined operation of what would be the case were some 
other time present, MSTists who accept the Modal Analysis must accept some version of 
TSB.15 TSB is often understood as the view that necessarily, all truths are necessitated by 
truths about what there is (quantifying at the first-order) and what fundamental first-order 
properties are instantiated by objects.16 However, this ‘objectual’ version of TSB is 
incompatible with the view that there are fundamental higher-order relations that do not 
supervene on the pattern of instantiation of fundamental first-order properties by objects.17 
MSTists who wish to maintain consistency with such views can instead accept the following 
‘higher-order’ version of TSB: 
 
                                               
15 As a referee for this journal pointed out to me, there being a well-defined operation of what would be the case 
were p the case (for any p) could be secured by an acceptance of Conditional Excluded Middle (∀p∀q(p □→ q ⋁ 
p □→ ¬q)) without assuming TSB. However, in that case the Modal Analysis would rely on counterfactuals, 
and avoiding counterfactuals is (as we have seen) part of the raison d’être of the Modal Analysis.   
16 See e.g. Bigelow (1998) and Lewis (1994, p. 473).  
17 An example of such a view is that defended by Hossack (2007). According to Hossack, the higher-order 
knowledge of relation between individuals and true propositions is fundamental.  
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TSB (HO): Necessarily, all truths are necessitated by truths about what there is (of any 
type) and what fundamental first- or higher-order properties are instantiated by things 
of the appropriate type18  
 
A question that might occur to some readers is whether the Modal Analysis is really 
distinct from, or is merely a version of, the Counterfactual Analysis. In particular, one might 
think that counterfactuals are contextually flexible enough that there is an interpretation of 
the Counterfactual Analysis on which it is equivalent to the Modal Analysis. Whether or not 
that is the case – it is at least not obviously the case – is not a question I will address here; but 
for convenience, I will continue to speak as if the analyses are distinct. 
 
4. The modal analysis: times 
Like the Counterfactual Analysis, the Modal Analysis relies on the notion of a time’s being 
present given MST. But how should MSTists conceive of times, and what is it for a time to 
be present given MST? As an anonymous referee for this journal pointed out to me, how 
MSTists answer these questions matters as to whether the Modal Analysis delivers the basic 
principles of standard linear tense logic.  
For example, suppose that according to MST, necessarily, times are hypersurfaces, 
and necessarily, a time is present just in case it possesses fundamental presentness. Now 
suppose that MSTists also accept the ‘principle of recombination’ according to which any 
distribution of fundamental properties is (metaphysically) possible, and therefore any 
distribution of fundamental presentness is possible.19 In that case, given MST, the (false) 
proposition that I possess fundamental presentness is possibly true. Moreover, that 
                                               
18 See especially Dorr (2019, §4.4.1).  
19 On the principle of recombination, see e.g. Lewis (1986, pp. 87-88).   
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proposition is compatible with the proposition q not about fundamental presentness that fully 
specifies the distribution of fundamental non-presentness properties and the proposition that t 
is the present time (i.e. that t possesses fundamental presentness), for any t. It follows by the 
Necessitation analysis of ‘at t’ that there is no time t such that at t, I do not possess 
fundamental presentness. But then, given the Quantificational Analysis of ‘S’, we have a 
failure of the tense-logical axiom Sometimes Introduction (∀p(p → Sp)): I do not possess 
fundamental presentness, but it is not the case that sometimes, I do not possess fundamental 
presentness.20  
 A second problem arises given the possibility that there is no unique present time, 
either because more than one hypersurface possesses fundamental presentness or no 
hypersurface possesses fundamental presentness (e.g. because there are no hypersurfaces). In 
that case, given MST, it is not necessary that there is a unique present time. However, by the 
Necessitation analysis of ‘at t’, it is necessarily the case that for any time t, at t, there is a 
unique present time; from which it follows given the Quantificational Analysis of ‘A’ that 
necessarily, always, there is a unique present time. Hence given MST, it is necessarily always 
the case that there is a unique present time, but it is not necessarily the case that there is a 
unique present time; which given standard modal reasoning entails that it is not necessarily 
the case that if there is always a unique present time then there is a unique present time. We 
have, therefore, a failure of the necessity of an instance of the tense-logical axiom Always 
Elimination (∀p(Ap → p)). 
 The two problems for MSTists described above arise from the combination of the 
principle of recombination with the traditional view of times and fundamental presentness 
given MST. MSTists can avoid these problems by rejecting the traditional view of times and 
                                               
20 An analogous argument can be used to show that the possibility of my possessing fundamental presentness 
generates a failure of Always Elimination (∀p(Ap → p)) given the Compatibility analysis of ‘at t’. 
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fundamental presentness given MST. An attractive alternative picture is that hypersurfaces 
are sets of spacetime points, and fundamental presentness is a property, not of hypersurfaces, 
but of spacetime points. Call the latter view Pointy Presentness: 
 
POINTY PRESENTNESS: Fundamental presentness is a (temporary) property of 
spacetime points 
 
Given Pointy Presentness, it is natural for MSTists to think of the present time as the 
set of all and only the spacetime points that possess fundamental presentness, which we 
assume form a hypersurface; and past and future times as hypersurfaces (i.e. sets of points) 
parallel to the hypersurface formed by the points that possess fundamental presentness. 
However, a lesson of the problems for the traditional view described above is that given the 
principle of recombination, MSTists need to be flexible about what the present time could be. 
For that reason, given Pointy Presentness, MSTists should define ‘present time’ is as follows 
(where ‘PresentF(x)’ means ‘x possesses fundamental presentness’): 
 
PRESENT TIME (MST): For a time t to be present is just for t to be the set of all and only 
the things that possess fundamental presentness 
∀t(Present(t) ≡ t = {x: PresentF(x)}) 
 
On this view, the present time is the unique set of all and only the things that possess 
fundamental presentness, which given Pointy Presentness are spacetime points and, we 
assume, form a hypersurface;21 and past and future times are hypersurfaces (i.e. sets of 
                                               
21 The present time does not itself possess fundamental presentness on this view, just as e.g. a set of electrons is 
not itself an electron. It follows that on this view, presentness as a property of times is a non-fundamental 
temporary property.  
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points) parallel to the hypersurface formed by the things that possess fundamental 
presentness. Given this definition of ‘present time’, ‘time’ can then be defined as follows: 
 
TIMES (MST): For some x to be a time is just for x to be the set of all and only the 
things that possess fundamental presentness, or to be a set of spacetime points 
forming a hypersurface h which is parallel to some other hypersurface h*, such that 
h* is the set of all and only the things that possess fundamental presentness 
 
It is worth drawing attention to some of the consequences for MSTists of the above 
view of times and of fundamental presentness. 
First, it avoids the problems described above arising from the combination of the 
traditional view of times and fundamental presentness given MST with the principle of 
recombination. As for the first problem: given that I do not actually possess fundamental 
presentness and that set-membership facts are necessary, the proposition that I possess 
fundamental presentness is incompatible with the proposition q not about fundamental 
presentness that fully specifies the distribution of fundamental non-presentness properties and 
the proposition that t is the present time (i.e. that t is the set of all and only the things that 
possess fundamental presentness), for any t. It follows that I do not possess fundamental 
presentness, and for any time t, at t, I do not possess fundamental presentness. Hence the 
failure of Sometimes Introduction is avoided. 
 As for the second problem: given that necessarily, there is a set of all and only the 
things that possess fundamental presentness (no matter how many or how few fundamentally 
present things there may be), it follows that necessarily, there is a unique present time. Hence 
the failure of the necessity of the relevant instance of Always Elimination is also avoided.  
 Second, the view lets MSTists adopt a picture of what the fundamental properties 
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other than fundamental presentness are that is in line with the standard B-theory, i.e. so that 
those other fundamental properties don’t privilege any special direction in spacetime.  
Third, given that parallel to is necessarily an equivalence relation on the set of times, 
it follows from the view that facts about which hypersurfaces are times are permanent. It also 
follows that necessarily, every time is a time at every time. Call this thesis Eternal 
Temporality: 
 
ETERNAL TEMPORALITY: Necessarily, everything that is a time is a time at every time 
□∀x(Time(x) → ∀t at t(Time(x))) 
 
Fourth, it follows from the view that in order for there to be multiple times, 
fundamental presentness has to be ‘well-behaved’, in the sense that its instances form an 
appropriate hypersurface; possibilities in which fundamental presentness is not well-behaved 
in that sense count as possibilities in which there is only one time.  
Some readers may wonder how the view of times and fundamental presentness 
described above carries over to a general relativistic (GR) setting. This is not a question I 
wish to address in detail here; however, it is nevertheless worth making a few points about 
the issue. First, the view at least provides a useful way to frame the question, as follows: is 
there a relation between regions of spacetime given GR that can play the role that parallelism 
plays in the definition of ‘time’ above? It may be that in certain ‘well-behaved’ GR 
spacetimes, there is; in which case, the view may be carried over to such settings. (Note that 
the parallel to relation mentioned in the definition of ‘time’ above does not have to be a 
fundamental relation; however, it does have to be an equivalence relation.) Second, notice 
that no version of MST (as it has been defined here) can be fully consistent with either the 
special or general relativistic views of fundamental temporal reality, in the sense of fully 
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agreeing with those views (or at least, with their philosophical interpretations) as to the nature 
of fundamental temporal reality. The reason is that MSTists are committed to Spotlight, and 
therefore to there being a fundamental monadic property in addition to the fundamental 
properties posited to spacetime physics. Of course, some philosophers will reject MST on this 
basis. But it also has implications for the question of whether the view of times and 
fundamental presentness described above can be carried over to a GR setting: given that 
MSTists already posit a fundamental property in addition to those posited by spacetime 
physics, they may be content to marry their view with GR by simply positing an additional 
fundamental permanent relation that can play the role in a GR setting that parallelism plays in 
the definition of ‘time’ above.22 
 
5. The modal analysis: virtues 
The Modal Analysis shares the virtues of, as well as avoiding the problems facing, the 
Counterfactual Analysis.  
Like the Counterfactual Analysis, the Modal Analysis secures the truth of 
Temporalism given MST, and therefore meets the requirement for change expressed by 
Priorian Change. Given the Modal Analysis, Temporalism (∃p(Sp ⋀ S¬p)) reduces to: 
 
                                               
22 See Bacon (2016) for the development of a view that aims to combine Temporalism with the special and 
general relativistic views of fundamental temporal reality. It is worth briefly describing some of the ways in 
which Bacon’s theory both resembles and differs from the version of MST defended in this paper. First, both 
theories are Temporalist and A-theoretic (in the sense of positing an absolute distinction between present and 
non-present times). Both theories also treat being a time and being present (as a property of times) as non-
fundamental properties. However, whereas according to Bacon’s view, all of the fundamental facts are 
permanent, according to the theory defended in this paper, some fundamental facts – in particular, facts about 
fundamental presentness – are temporary. Given that Bacon also holds that all facts supervene on the 
fundamental facts and that some (non-fundamental) facts are temporary, it follows that on Bacon’s view, there 
are temporary (metaphysical) necessities (see Bacon 2016, note 27); whereas the theory defended in this paper 
is consistent with, and in fact implies, the view that necessity implies permanence (see especially Dorr & 
Goodman 2020).  
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(10) For some p: there is a time t1 such that the proposition that t1 is the present time 
together with some fact q not about fundamental presentness necessitates p; and there 
is a time t2 such that the proposition that t2 is the present time together with some fact 
r not about fundamental presentness necessitates not-p 
∃p(∃t1(∃q(q ⋀ Cq ⋀ □((q ⋀ Present(t1)) → p))) ⋀ ∃t2(∃r(r ⋀ Cr ⋀ □((r ⋀ Present(t2)) 
→ ¬p)))) 
 
And (10) is true given MST. For example, let p be the proposition that n is present, where ‘n’ 
names this time (although note that any time would do). There is a time t1 – namely, n – such 
that the conjunction of some true proposition not about fundamental presentness (e.g. the 
proposition that n = n) with the proposition that t1 is present necessitates p, and there is a 
time  t2 – for example, some moment in 1996 – such that the conjunction of some true 
proposition not about fundamental presentness (e.g. the proposition that n = n) with the 
proposition that t2 is present necessitates not-p. 
The Modal Analysis also avoids the problems for the Counterfactual Analysis 
described in §2 above that motivated the search for an alternative to that view. First, it 
provides a fundamental analysis of ‘at t(p)’ given an analysis of p in fundamental terms. This 
is especially clear if we take ‘□’ in the Modal Analysis as fundamental, or if we treat the 
entailment relation between propositions as fundamental.  
Second, it secures the basic principles of standard linear tense logic. For reasons of 
space, I focus on just two here: Always Elimination (∀p(Ap → p)), the temporal analogue of 
the modal axiom ‘T’ that what must be the case is the case (∀p(□p → p)); and Sometimes 
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Elimination (∀p(SSp → Sp)), which was introduced in §2 above in relation to the 
Counterfactual Analysis.23   
 We begin with Always Elimination: 
 
 ALWAYS ELIMINATION: What is always the case is the case 
 ∀p(Ap → p) 
 
The Modal Analysis secures the necessary truth of Always Elimination given MST. To see 
this, we begin by noting that given the Modal Analysis, Always Elimination is equivalent to: 
 
(11) For any p: if for any time t, p is necessitated by some true proposition q not about 
fundamental presentness and the proposition that t is the present time, then p 
∀p(∀t(∃q(q ⋀ Cq ⋀ □((q ⋀ Present(t)) → p))) → p) 
 
It is easy to see that (11) is necessarily true given MST. Take any proposition p: necessarily, 
if for any time t, p is necessitated by some true proposition q not about fundamental 
presentness and the proposition that t is the present time, then in particular, for this time n, p 
                                               
23 In order to secure an S5 logic for ‘Always’, we would need the following principles in addition to Always 
Elimination and Sometimes Elimination: 
 
ETERNALISATION: If p is a theorem then Ap is also a theorem 
 
ALWAYS DISTRIBUTION: ∀p∀q(A(p → q) → (Ap → Aq)) 
 
TEMPORAL B: ∀p(p → ASp) 
 
Eternalisation is the temporal analogue of the modal axiom ‘Necessitation’, according to which if p is a theorem 
then ◻p is also a theorem. Eternalisation follows from Necessitation given the principle that what must be the 
case is always the case (∀p(◻p → Ap)), which follows immediately from the Modal Analysis. Always 
Distribution is the temporal analogue of the modal axiom ‘K’ that if necessarily, p only if q, then necessarily p 
only if necessarily q (∀p∀q(◻(p → q) → (◻p → ◻q))). Finally, Temporal B is the temporal analogue of the 
modal axiom ‘B’ that what is the case must be possible (∀p(p → ◻♢p)). I leave it as an exercise for readers to 
show that the Modal Analysis secures the necessary truth of Always Distribution and Temporal B given MST.  
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is necessitated by some true proposition q not about fundamental presentness and the 
proposition that n is the present time. Given that according to MST, the proposition that n is 
the present time (i.e. that all and only the members of n possess fundamental presentness) is 
true, it follows that p. 
Next, Sometimes Elimination: 
 
SOMETIMES ELIMINATION: What is sometimes sometimes the case is sometimes the 
case ∀p(SSp → Sp) 
 
Given the Compatibility analysis of ‘at t’, ‘SSp’ reduces to: 
 
(12) ∀q((q ⋀ Cq) → ∃t1♢(Present(t1) ⋀ q ⋀ ∀r((r ⋀ Cr) → ∃t2♢(Present(t2) ⋀ r ⋀ 
p)))) 
 
Given the Barcan and Converse Barcan Formulas for ‘□’ (i.e. □∀xFx ↔ ∀x□Fx)24 and 
Eternal Temporality (□∀x(Time(x) → ∀t at t(Time(x)))), we can move the quantifiers over 
times in (12) to inside the scope of the modal operators, to get: 
 
(13) ∀q((q ⋀ Cq) → ♢(∃t1(Present(t1)) ⋀ q ⋀ ∀r((r ⋀ Cr) → ♢(∃t2(Present(t2)) ⋀ r ⋀ 
p)))) 
 
                                               
24 Contingentists – according to whom there could be things that could have been nothing – may find this 
assumption controversial on the interpretation of ‘◻’ as expressing metaphysical necessity. However, see 
Williamson (2013) for an argument against Contingentism. Note also that ‘◻’ does not have to be interpreted as 
expressing metaphysical necessity here; it could simply be interpreted as expressing necessitation by what 
propositions there are, for which BF and CBF should be automatic whether of not they true for metaphysical 
necessity.  
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To show that (13) entails ‘Sp’, we must make the following three assumptions: 
 
 (i) ‘□’ obeys the modal axiom ‘4’ (∀p(□p → □□p)) 
(ii) ‘□’ obeys the Converse Barcan Formula, or ‘CBF’ (□∀xFx → ∀x□Fx) 
(iii) For any p, if p is not about fundamental presentness then necessarily, p is not 
about fundamental presentness (∀p(Cp → □Cp)) 
 
Given that CBF implies ♢∀xFx → ∀x♢Fx, we can move the quantifier ‘∀r’ in (13) to outside 
the scope of the initial ‘♢’, to get: 
 
(14) SSp ⊧ ∀q((q ⋀ C(q)) → ∀r♢(∃t1(Present(t1)) ⋀ q ⋀ ((r ⋀ C(r)) → 
♢(∃t2(Present(t2)) ⋀ r ⋀ p)))) 
 
Next, we instantiate r with q to get: 
 
(15) SSp ⊧ ∀q((q ⋀ C(q)) → ♢(∃t1(Present(t1)) ⋀ q ⋀ ((q ⋀ C(q)) → 
♢(∃t2(Present(t2)) ⋀ q ⋀ p)))) 
 
By assumption (iii) above we also have ∀p(Cp → □Cp), so we can drop the second instance 
of ‘Cq’ in the above to get: 
 




By the basic modal logic ‘K’, (16) implies: 
 
(17) SSp ⊧ ∀q((q ⋀ C(q)) → ♢♢(∃t(Present(t)) ⋀ q ⋀ p)) 
 
Finally, by the modal axiom ‘4’, (17) implies: 
 
 (18) SSp ⊧ ∀q((q ⋀ C(q)) → ♢(∃t(Present(t)) ⋀ q ⋀ p)) 
 
As ‘∀q((q ⋀ C(q)) → ♢(∃t(Present(t)) ⋀ q ⋀ p))’ is equivalent to ‘Sp’ given the Modal 




MST is not for everyone. Some philosophers reject Permanentism on the grounds that e.g. 
Queen Nefertiti is now nothing; some philosophers reject Spotlight on the grounds that every 
fundamental property is permanent. However, some Permanentists may be sympathetic to the 
idea that there are temporary fundamental properties. They face a question: if there are such 
properties, are there very many, or just a few, or exactly one? The answer according to MST 
is: exactly one. This may seem like an oddly specific answer. Why would anyone who thinks 
that there is at least one temporary fundamental property be so opinionated as to think that 
the number of such properties is exactly one? This paper can be seen as providing an answer 
to that question: because it makes available a certain attractive reductive analysis of the tense 
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operators (i.e. the Modal Analysis). In other words, given Spotlight, Permanentists can 
provide a reductive analysis of change over time.25  
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